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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 09/07/2011

Accident number: 728

Accident time: 11:00

Accident Date: 17/06/2010

Where it occurred: AF/2802/00362,
MF0055, Quryak
Village, Shiber district
Bamyan Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Other

Date of main report: None

ID original source: None

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: YM-1 AP blast

Ground condition: steep slope
Date last modified: 09/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate area marking (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more
information becomes available.
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT-21 DEMINING ACCIDENT
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INTRODUCTION:
An investigation team was convened by AMAC Central to investigate the de-mining accident
involving [the Victim] the deminer of [Demining group] DT-21. The accident occurred at 11:00
hours on 17 June 2010 at minefield number AF/2802/00362/MF 0055, located in Quryak
village, Shiber district of Bamyan Province.
SUMMARY:
Minefield (MF) 0055 is located in a mountainous area which was frontline between belligerent
groups during the internal war in 1998. From the military point of view the area was important
for both sides of the conflict factions. Therefore, the AP mines were laid there by Hizb-eWahdat militias to stop the attacks of their opposition (Taliban). So far two mine accidents
occurred there on local people.
[Demining group] cleared around 1 sq km highly contaminated area since last year in Shiber
district of Bamyan province. During the clearance operations they found/destroyed 174
Iranian YM I AP mines there.
On 17 June 2010 at 11:00 [the Victim] was busy in his clearance lane in a steep sloping area,
he lost his balance, got out from his clearance lane to unclear ground, stepped on a YM-I
mine and the accident happened. According to the investigation report the team is walking
around one and half hours from the base comp to the MF on daily basis which makes the
deminers tired. The marking signs in clearance lane were weak and even not distinguishable;
the gritty and sliding nature of the ground is another risk factor in this specific minefield. Extra
safety measures are required in such areas, for example creating feet steps in order for
deminers to be stable during the operations, close supervision and control of the deminers.
The consequences of this accident were traumatic amputation of left leg below knee plus
some superficial injuries on right leg and right hand fingers of deminer.
CONCLUSIONS:
Poor marking and lack of preparation in such steep sloping area are the main contributing
factors to this accident. These factors return back to poor supervision and poor site
operations plan.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
The following points are to be considered:
•

Strengthening supervision should be the main focus of operations departments of all
mine action organizations.

•

Internal QA system should be improved and frequent monitoring should be conducted
in such problematic areas.

•

A comprehensive operations plan should be developed by the team command group
considering all risk factors of the working site.

•

The team command group should make sure that the marking system is as per SOPs
and maintained properly throughout the operations.

Feedback on any preventive and corrective actions taken by [Demining group] is required to
be submitted to the MACCA OPS department by no later than 7 days, effective to the issue
date of this letter.
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Victim Report
Victim number: 920

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Not recorded

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: minor Hand; minor Leg
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Leg Below knee
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "traumatic amputation of left leg below
knee plus some superficial injuries on right leg and right hand fingers of deminer".

Analysis
The primary and secondary cause of this accident are listed as Field Control inadequacy
because the investigators found that the demining procedures and marking system in use
were inappropriate and caused the accident. The demining group’s inability to plan and
control a task appropriately was a significant Management Control Inadequacy.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years
in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. National staff have been more responsible
than the internationals with overall responsibility.
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